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Justice  Reform:  Who’s  Got  the  Power?
Yevgeniy Mayba

Abstract
As the US prison population continues to rise despite the
significant decrease in crime rates, scholars and social activists
are demanding comprehensive reforms to the penal system that
disproportionately affects minorities and the poor and has
become a significant burden on the taxpayers. This paper
examines some of the processes that contributed to the rise of the
modern day carceral state, such as the determinate sentencing
reform and the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentencing.
It also explores the unintended consequences of these penal
developments and traces the reaction and subsequent resistance
to these sentencing schemes from the judiciary, as well as other
sources. Finally, this paper examines the dynamics of power
between various actors in the struggle for meaningful reforms in
the penal system and argues for a concerted action aimed at
stimulating meaningful action from the legislature that has so far
largely abstained from major efforts at reforming the criminal
justice system.
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Introduction
Harsh mandatory minimum sentences are not unique to the
US justice system, nor are they a recent development. From the
“eye  for  an  eye”  justice  of  the  Hammurabi’s  Code  (Johns,  1904)  
to the US federal laws of 18th century that prescribe a
“mandatory  10-year minimum prison term for causing a ship to
run  aground  by  using  a  false  light”  (Luna  &  Cassell, 2010, p. 9),
harsh mandatory punishments have been a feature of justice
systems throughout the world. What is unique in the modern US
justice system is the extent of the use of mandatory minimum
sentences, the vastness of the array of crimes that are covered by
mandatory minimum statutes, and the effect that these laws have
had on the incarceration rates and the size of prison population
over the last four decades. As the negative consequences of these
laws became increasingly severe and both social and economic
costs mounted, social advocacy groups and academia have
responded with increasing criticism and demand for changes to
the justice system. Among this backlash, a peculiar pattern of
judicial activism has emerged with courts striving to restore
judicial discretion in sentencing and establishing a new system
of collaborative courts that aim to divert offenders from
incarceration and into treatment programs. This ongoing contest
between the legislative and judicial branches is particularly
interesting when viewed through the prism of a larger struggle
for policy and law making powers between these two branches
of the government. As Horowitz (1977) argued in his
examination of the judicial powers, courts have greatly expanded
their policy making capacity through a series of key Supreme
Court decisions that have affected countrywide policy changes,
infringing on the domain of the legislative branch and its sole
capacity for law making.
VOLUME III 2015
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol3/iss1/3
DOI: 10.31979/THEMIS.2015.0303

2

Mayba: Justice Reform

48
Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Mandatory minimum sentences are a product of
legislative statutes that prescribe sentences for particular
offenses and oftentimes force judges to impose harsher sentences
for particular sets of aggravating circumstances, such as gun
possession or gang affiliation. With over 170 mandatory
minimum penalties in the Federal Criminal Code alone (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2010) and countless similar statutes
passed by state legislatures, mandatory minimum sentences have
come to dominate the penal system and cover a wide variety of
criminal offenses. Some mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes, like the Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York and the
Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, automatically trigger
prescribed mandatory sentences for simple possession and
possession with intent to distribute certain legislatively
determined and codified amounts of various illicit substances.
Other statutes deal with issues such as gang membership, like the
Illinois Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Street Gang
member law, by imposing additional penalties on gang members
for carrying a firearm outside of their homes (Kizer, 2012).
Though varying in severity and scope, these statutes have one
common theme, in that they leave little room for judicial
discretion and effectively place sentencing power in the hands of
the legislature that creates these statutes and the prosecutors who
choose which charges to file against the offender.
One of the earliest examples of a radical shift away from
the rehabilitation approach to solving social problems, and
towards a mandatory sentencing framework, was the adoption of
the Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York (Mann, 2013).
Proposed by Nelson Rockefeller, who at that time was the
governor of New York, and passed by the state legislature in
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1973, these laws established harsh mandatory minimum
sentences for drug possession and distribution, and created
sentence enhancements for offenses committed under the
influence of illicit substances. Even though Governor
Rockefeller had previously viewed drugs as a social, rather than
a criminal problem, the passage of these laws came in the wake
of the declaration of the war on drugs by President Nixon and the
rise   in   popularity   of   the   “tough   on   crime”   approach   that  
accompanied the shift to the determinate sentencing model
(Mann, 2013).
Determinate Sentencing Reform
The determinate sentencing reform that shifted penal
practices towards mandatory minimum sentences was a response
to the widespread criticism of the vast discrepancies in
sentencing under the previous indeterminate model of sentencing
and a call for a more just system characterized by consistency
and fairness (Frankel, 1972). Since judicial discretion was
viewed as a cornerstone of the system that allowed similarly
situated offenders to be sentenced to drastically different
punitive terms, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 completely
overhauled federal sentencing procedures, imposing strict limits
on judicial discretion in sentencing (Cassidy, 2009).
The supporters of the determinate sentencing model have
argued that the system of legislatively prescribed sentences
effectively punishes, incapacitates, and deters offenders from
committing future crimes (Lowenthal, 1993). For instance, Tittle
and Rowe (1974) found that certainty of imprisonment deters the
commission of offenses. These findings indicate that a system of
harsh mandatory punishment creates a greater general deterrent
effect and sends a message to all potential criminals that crimes
would be punished in a certain, predictable and harsh manner
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without exceptions and hope for leniency from the judge.
Mandatory minimum sentences are also viewed by their
supporters as useful tools for prosecutors and law enforcement
officials. The potential of a harsh mandatory sentence can induce
cooperation from the offender in exchange for reducing the
charges and can lead to greater success in complex investigations
as well as induce plea bargaining that avoids costly trials and
saves time and money for the justice system and taxpayers (Luna
& Cassell, 2010).
Prior to the determinate sentencing reform, the
indeterminate sentencing model coupled with the rehabilitative
approach to corrections allowed prison and parole officials to
exercise their discretion in releasing inmates who were sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence that ranged from a lower to an
upper limit imposed by a judge. While this model allowed for a
greater flexibility of the system and for an individual
examination  of  each  offender’s  case  and  personal  circumstances,  
criticism of the disparity in sentencing of similar offenders as
well as that of the rehabilitative model of corrections led to a
series of reforms and a move towards the determinate sentencing
model dominated by mandatory minimum sentencing statutes.
This transition effectively transferred discretional powers from
the judicial branch and corrections departments to the legislation
passing these statutes and the executive-prosecutorial side of the
system that implemented them (Luna & Cassell, 2010).
Although the seeds of the reform had already been
planted with various laws such as the Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 that included mandatory sentencing
enhancement for gun possession, the dismantling of the
rehabilitation  model  of  corrections  can  be  traced  to  Martinson’s  
report on the efficacy of the rehabilitative programs in prisons
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entitled What works? Questions and answers about prison
reform (Martinson,   1974).   Also   known   as   the   “nothing   works”  
report, this examination of 231 studies of the efficacy of
rehabilitation in prisons did not find any tangible results
produced   by   these   programs.   The   report’s   findings   allowed  
critics   of   the   disparity   in   sentencing   that   hinged   on   offenders’  
alleged rehabilitation and subsequent early release to launch a
legislative campaign that ushered in an era of determinate
sentencing and major reductions in funding for rehabilitative
programs in prisons. In 1989, the Supreme Court affirmed the
legitimacy of this shift in its decision in Mistretta v. United
States (1989), determining that the possibility of rehabilitation
should not be a factor in sentencing. This decision also upheld
the legitimacy of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that
established the US Sentencing Commission as an expert agency
designed to significantly curb judicial discretion in sentencing
through the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
These guidelines came into effect in 1987 and were
designed to provide sentencing judges with a prescribed sentence
depending on the circumstances of the case. Punishment was
effectively limited to the ranges offered by the guidelines and the
rigidity of the compulsory nature of these guidelines
significantly curbed judicial discretion. While the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission in
Mistretta, many critics questioned the alleged expertise of the
Commission, as well as its legitimacy given the fair amount of
legislative power that was transferred to it by Congress (Luna &
Cassell, 2010).
Ironically, while the Sentencing Guidelines were
intended by the legislative branch to curb judicial discretion,
they also contained a unique check on the possible abuse of the
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executive power. While the new sentencing structure transferred
discretionary authority in sentencing from the judicial to the
executive branch by allowing prosecutors to determine which
charges to pursue, it also endowed judges with the authority to
serve as the fact finding body which enabled them to impose
sentences harsher than those that were prescribed for the charges
filed by the prosecutors (Starr & Rehavi, 2013). Designed to
limit prosecutorial power used to coerce defendants into pleading
guilty by threatening to file harsher charges at trial, this power of
fact finding has not only failed its purpose, but on the contrary,
has led to instances of judges imposing unjustifiably harsh
sentences.
While the departure from the indeterminate sentencing
model, which gave broad powers of discretion to sentencing
judges and parole boards, is often justified by claims of resulting
standardization of sentencing of similarly situated offenders, the
extreme severity of the newly emerged determinate sentencing
model based on legislatively prescribed harsh mandatory
minimum sentences can, in large part, be attributed to the
portrayal of crime in national media and the subsequent effects
of  media  coverage  on  the  public’s  perception  of  crime.  
Media and Mass Hysteria
As major networks and their news programming faced
stiffer competition in the late 1980s and early 1990s from an
explosion of new channels, all-news networks, and later the
internet, economic pressures and a drive for profits pushed them
away   from   “hard   news”   and   towards   a   greater   emphasis   on  
sensationalist reporting of crime stories (Beale, 2006). As a
result, despite the falling crime rates, crime became the leading
topic covered in the evening news shows in the 1990s. While
fewer than 100 murder stories per year were featured on the
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news between 1990 and 1992, that number rose to 511 between
1997 and 1999, with greater prevalence of criminal trials and
investigations in the news coverage than of political and social
issues (Beale, 2006). This drastic increase in crime coverage
created an atmosphere of fear through which various civil
liberties have been curtailed by the enhanced power of the
government and the increased ease of prosecution (Simon,
2007).
Along with the increased coverage of crime in the news,
crime-themed programming that Wacquant (2010) referred to as
“crystallization  of  law-and-order  pornography”  (p.  206)  has  also  
permeated  commercial  media.  Hamilton’s   (1998) exploration of
this phenomenon reveals that the level of violence in television
programming   is   directly   related   to   broadcasters’   attempts   to  
attract particular audiences and is also dependent on the products
to be advertised. As specific brand identities are established and
promoted to specific audiences, violence levels in the media are
adjusted to maximize programming attractiveness to advertisers
with little regard for accurate representation of societal issues
(Beale, 2006).
News   media’s   presentation of violent crime as a
widespread phenomenon directed public attention to crime as a
perceived social issue of great importance, and greatly
influenced the criteria by which the public judges proposed and
existing public policies, as well as how it views its officials and
candidates for office (Beale, 2006, Simon 2007). Politicians
responded   to   this   mass   hysteria   with   “tough-on-crime”   slogans,  
and by 1992, political debate on the relative merits of
punishment and rehabilitation had all but disappeared, as the
consensus   of   “law   and   order”   was   reached   by   both   political  
parties (Platt, 2011). With political rhetoric echoing
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disproportionate coverage of crime on television and in print, the
United States justice system embarked on an unprecedented
punishment  spree  that  helped  to  make  America  “the  single  most  
punitive   Western   nation   and   the   world’s   imprisonment   leader”  
(Luna & Cassell, 2010, p. 22).
The Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 that
established federal mandatory minimum sentences for drug
offenses was enacted by Congress as a response to the mass
hysteria over the crack cocaine epidemic (Luna & Cassel, 2010).
This rise in public concern was flamed by the media during a
decade-long campaign that painted a picture of crack as being
widespread, highly addictive, and a major cause of violent
crimes despite the lack of evidence to support such claims
(Reinarman & Levine, 2004). Adding to the hysteria and the
calls   for   drastic   measures   was   the   “crack   babies”   myth,   largely  
based on limited and questionable research that failed to take
into account compounding factors, such as malnourishment, lack
of prenatal care, alcohol and tobacco abuse, as well as personal
medical histories. Presented to the public without any empirical
evidence, the myth persists today despite substantial amounts of
research showing that crack cocaine does not cause extensive
damage as claimed by various experts on television shows, and
that the damage that can be attributed to the use of crack cocaine
can be reversed with proper medical care and a stable home
environment (Reinarman & Levine, 2004).
Some magazines and newspapers later published
retractions and articles admitting that the crack cocaine problem
had been greatly exaggerated (Reinarman & Levine, 2004). Yet,
the 100 to 1 sentencing disparity between cocaine and crack
cocaine created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986 persisted
until 2010 when the Fair Sentencing Act lowered this
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discrepancy  to  18  to  1.  The  influence  of  the  media’s  inaccurate  
and greatly exaggerated portrayal of the crack cocaine epidemic
can be seen in the failure of the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce
sentencing disparity to the intended 1 to 1 ratio, with some
opposing politicians predicting the return of inner city violence
that would endanger children (Luna & Cassell, 2010).
Similar media-fueled hysteria has led to a significant
reform of the juvenile justice system. Despite national crime
statistics indicating a decline in crime rates, several academics
created and promoted an idea of an upcoming generation of
juvenile   “super-predators”   (Pizarro,   Chermak   &   Gruenewald,  
2007),   who   were   “radically   impulsive,   brutally   remorseless  
youngsters, including ever more pre-teenage boys, who murder,
assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun toting
gangs and create serious communal disorders" (Bennett, Dilulio,
& Walters, 1996, p. 27). Although Dilulio later admitted to being
wrong   about   the   emergence   of   these   “super-predator”   juveniles  
(Becker, 2001), the damage had been done. Overestimating the
volume and seriousness of the crime for which the juvenile
offenders were responsible, almost all states passed legislation
allowing the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult justice
systems and subjecting them to mandatory minimum sentences,
including sentences of life in prison without possibility of parole
(Roberts, 2004).
Driven by political ambition, moral panic, and
diminishing discussion of social issues in the media, determinate
sentencing reforms and mandatory minimum sentences triggered
an unprecedented growth of the correctional and justice system
in the United States. With academics arguing that the modern
penal system creates, and subsequently subjugates, a new
underclass of the poor and minorities through selective
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enforcement and negative stigmatization (Alexander, 2012), or
controls a surplus of workforce population through increased
criminalization and reduction in social welfare programs
(Wacquant, 2010), the consequences of the determinate
sentencing reform have been scrutinized and critiqued at great
length.
Consequences and Efficacy of Mandatory Minimum
Sentences
One of the most tangible consequences of the
determinate sentencing reform and the increased severity of
punishments has been the significant increase in prison
populations across the United States. Federal prison population
has increased tenfold since 1980, while the average length of a
federal sentence doubled and the average length of a federal drug
sentence tripled (Luna & Cassell, 2010). According to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, there were approximately 6,937,600
offenders under some form of correctional supervision in the
United States in 2012, of which 2,228,400 were incarcerated in
prisons and local jails (Glaze & Herberman, 2013). At the same
time, the spending on both the   federal   and   states’   correctional  
systems has increased 660% between 1982 and 2006 (Seiter,
2011). This increase is considerably greater than the increase in
the police and judicial spending combined (Seiter, 2011). With
estimated costs of incarcerating an offender being between
$20,000 and $40,000 per year (Spelman, 2009), the federal
corrections costs alone increased by 925% between 1982 and
2007 to an annual budget of $5.4 billion (U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2010).
Proponents of the system of severe punishment have
argued that increased incapacitation of violent offenders creates
a   specific   deterrent   effect   by   limiting   offender’s   ability   to  
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recidivate (Shinnar & Shinnar, 1975; Mueller, 1992). This
argument, however, ignores the current lack of rehabilitative
programs in prisons, which in turn may lead to inmates picking
up criminal activities and skills from other inmates and
furthering their criminal careers upon their release. It also fails to
account for the possibility of incapacitated criminals being
replaced on the street by other individuals in the community
(Piehl, Useem & Dilulio, 1999). In the particular case of drug
offenders, the argument for further prison expansion runs
contrary to the principle of diminishing returns. As Piehl, Useem
and Dilulio (1999) demonstrated, when the most serious
offenders  are  apprehended,  “prison  growth  requires  the  criminal  
justice system to reach deeper into the pool of prison-eligible
offenders, such that increases in incarceration are less and less
cost-effective”   (p.   12).   The   increase   in   sentence   severity   for  
violent crimes – as well as drug offenses – has created a net
widening effect that increased the punitiveness of the justice
system as a whole, with many offenders serving jail and prison
sentences when the severity of their crime does not warrant such
harsh sentences (Morris & Tonry, 1991).
The increasing costs of maintaining a large prison
population, and the judicial apparatus required to process large
numbers of offenders have drained state budgets and caused a
decrease in numbers of law enforcement officers on the job.
Corman and Mocan (2000) demonstrated in their research that
putting more officers on the street led to a significant reduction
in crime rates. Their study examined records from a crime
analysis unit of the New York Police Department, as well as
records from various other city agencies for a 30-year period
since 1970. They compared crime rates with numbers of police
officers employed by the city and revealed that increases in
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numbers of police officers corresponded with significant
reduction in robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle theft, as
well as minor reduction in murder and assault rates. They
supplemented their study with research examining the effect of
economic factors on crime rates (Corman & Mocan, 2005).
Using the data from their previous research, they looked at the
relationship between crime rates and unemployment rate, as well
as minimum wage and prison population. The study also
examined the effect of arrests regardless of whether they resulted
in convictions. They found that a decline in unemployment rate
corresponded to declining rates for burglaries and motor vehicle
theft. Increased numbers of arrests corresponded to decreases in
crime rates and were consistent with increases in the numbers of
police officers employed by the city. Combined with the results
from their previous research, these findings indicate that
increased certainty of punishment through increases in police
presence and arrests, along with improved economic conditions,
can effectively lower crime rates. Their findings, with regards to
a lack of a relationship between crime rates and prison
population, however, suggest that increases in prison population
do not have a deterrent effect and do not contribute to decreasing
crime rates (Corman & Mocan, 2005). The above referenced
research and findings are supported by similar research by Evans
and Owens (2006), who examined the effect of the Community
Oriented Policing Services program aimed at increasing the
number of police officers by providing federal funding to state
and local agencies for hiring and training purposes. Their
examination of 2074 cities and towns in the 11 year period
starting in 1990 revealed significant reductions in motor vehicle
theft, burglaries, robberies and aggravated assaults, which
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corresponded to the increase in number of police officers on the
job (Evans & Owen, 2006).
The critiques of increased use of incarceration as a
means of increasing general deterrence have also been supported
by Durlauf and Nagin (2011), who demonstrated that
California’s  Three  Strikes  Law  has  managed  to  reduce  the  felony  
crime rate by only 2%. They also argued that the declining crime
rates were not a direct result of such laws, since the analysis of
annual data demonstrated not only that crime rates have begun to
decline prior to their existence, but also that the rate of the
decline has remained constant and has appeared to be unaffected
by these laws and statutes (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011).
In addition to sapping the resources from law
enforcement, the increased spending required to support long
sentences and large numbers of prison inmates created by the
determinate sentencing reform have also contributed to the
underfunding of the prosecutors. As Gershowitz and Killinger
(2011) pointed out, due to the lack of funding, most prosecutors
are overburdened with caseloads. Such conditions have resulted
in prosecutors committing inadvertent mistakes that may have
led to the incarceration of an innocent person, or a not guilty
verdict for a guilty one. This lack of resources and manpower
has also led to trial delays, which often results in guilty pleas by
innocent people in exchange for a sentence of time already
served while awaiting trial. Although underfunded and
undermanned, the prosecutors remain one of the most powerful
court agents. While judicial discretion has been severely limited
by the determinate sentencing reform and the introduction of
mandatory minimum sentences and mandatory enhancements,
prosecutors still have the ultimate decision power over which
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charges are going to be filed and which crimes are to be
prosecuted.
Despite the fact that prosecutors are oftentimes
motivated to bring harsher charges and achieve higher conviction
rates due to their career ambitions (Boylan & Long, 2005), some
prosecutors began exercising their discretion and charging
offenders with lesser crimes to avoid lengthy sentences of
incarceration   in   response   to   the   introduction   of   California’s  
Three Strikes laws (Gershowitz & Killinger, 2011).
Overwhelmed and overworked, prosecutors are forced to
circumvent the existing mandatory sentencing laws in order to
restore the element of justice to the current system of
punishment. However, while prosecutorial discretion can serve
as a safeguard for the justice system, it can also result in a
violation of one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
constitution, the right to trial. As Marvell and Moody (2000)
demonstrated in their comprehensive study of the effect of
determinate sentencing laws on trial delay and rates, determinate
sentencing laws increase court delays and generally cause a
decline in the rates of jury trials. Mandatory enhancements and
charge-based sentencing also allow the prosecution to decide the
degree of leniency that courts may consider. As Lowenthal
(1993) pointed out,
Prosecutors can charge mandatory enhancement
allegations in all cases in which there is a factual basis
for doing so, even when sufficiently mitigating
circumstances indicate that the enhancement provisions
should not be enforced. The mandatory sentencing
consequences of a guilty verdict pressure defendants,
who   otherwise   might   test   the   state’s   evidence,   into  
accepting guilty pleas. Indeed, a legislature can make
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charge-based mandatory punishment so commonplace
and severe that few if any defendants will be willing to
chance a trial. (p. 78)
And as Luna and Cassell (2010) concluded in their review of
mandatory minimum sentencing scheme:
…   [A]   number   of   studies   suggest   that   the   use   of  
federal mandatory minimums has tended to generate
disparate sentences among similarly situated offenders.
The claim of crime reduction has been contested as well,
with most researchers finding no deterrent effect from
mandatory sentencing laws. The statistics also seem to
belie categorical assertions of government necessity. The
rate   of   cooperation   (or   “substantial   assistance”)   in  
mandatory minimum cases is comparable to the average
in all federal cases, while most recipients of federal drug
minimums are couriers, mules, and street-level dealers,
not kingpins or leaders in international drug cartels. (pp.
19-20)
Restoring Judicial Discretion in Sentencing
While testifying before the Congressional Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security in the hearing on
mandatory minimum sentences and their unintended
consequences in 2009, Chief Judge Julie Carnes, speaking on the
behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, stated that
mandatory provisions
…[S]weep   broadly,   sweeping   in   both   the   egregious
offender as well as other less culpable offenders who
may have violated the statute. Necessarily, the sentence
that may be appropriate for the most egregious offender
will often be excessive for this less culpable person.
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010, p. 35)
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Her statement was seconded by Texas Judge Ted Poe, who
stated   that   “Congress   cannot,   even   in   its   great   wisdom,   pass  
appropriate legislation to cover every type of criminal case that
there  is  because  there  are  no  two  cases  alike”  (U.S.  Government
Printing Office, 2010, p. 33). Both of these statements reflect a
growing judicial frustration with mandatory minimum
sentencing schemes and their effect on sentencing structure. This
frustration has led to judicial activism that resulted in a series of
Supreme Court cases that amended the role of the Sentencing
Guidelines and restored a measure of judicial discretion in
sentencing.
In the early 2000s, the U.S. Supreme Court began
redefining its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence with Apprendi v.
New Jersey (2000) and Blakeley v. Washington (2004). Although
the Court did not discuss the Sentencing Guidelines at length, it
held   in   both   cases   that   any   fact   that   increases   a   defendant’s  
sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury
despite its previous refusals to extend trial phase procedural
protection to sentencing hearings (Cassidy, 2009). Similarly to
Apprendi and Blakely, United States v. Booker (2005) dealt with
the issue of fact-finding authority of judges and the provision of
the Sentencing Guidelines that mandated judges to impose
sentences within the specified ranges. While the jury found
Booker guilty of possessing at least 50 grams of crack cocaine,
the sentencing judge found additional evidence and, following
the Sentencing Guidelines, increased his minimum sentence by
20 years. The Court ruled that since this provision of the
Guidelines was mandatory and binding on all judges, it violated
the   Sixth   Amendment.   The   Court’s   decision   made   Sentencing  
Guidelines effectively advisory and allowed district courts to
deviate from them during sentencing. In addition to confirming
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its new interpretation of its Sixth Amendment jurisdiction in
Booker, the Court also reintroduced the role of judicial factfinding during sentencing, by allowing judges to deviate from
the Sentencing Guidelines necessitating further clarifications of
this decision.
In Rita v. United States (2007), the Court reiterated its
position on the advisory nature of the Guidelines by stating that
courts of appeals may, although not required to, presume that a
sentence within the Guidelines is reasonable. It also stated that
appellate   courts   must   treat   judges’   choice   of   sentence   with  
deference (Cassidy, 2009). In Kimbrough v. United States
(2007), the Supreme Court overturned the vacating of a sentence
by the Court of Appeals and ruled that a sentence outside the
guidelines range was reasonable, even when based on the district
judge’s   disagreement   with   the   100:1   sentencing   disparity   in  
crack cocaine vs. cocaine cases. The Court further promoted
district   judges’   discretion   in   Gall v. United States (2007) by
ruling that an appellate court may not reverse a sentence based
on the fact that it might have reached a different conclusion. The
Court reaffirmed that deference must be given to  district  judges’  
discretion and that the totality of all circumstances must be taken
into consideration during the sentence review by an appellate
court (Cassidy, 2009). Following Kimbrough and Gall, district
courts were free to exercise their discretion in sentencing crack
and powder cocaine offenders, and to deviate from the 100:1
ratio established by the Sentencing Guidelines and the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act in 1986.
This restoration of judicial discretion in sentencing
remains a controversial issue. In his dissent in Booker, Justice
Stevens predicted the return of the sentencing disparities that
necessitated the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and the 2010
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and 2013 reports of the U.S. Sentencing Commission appears to
support his opinion, finding that the black-white sentencing gap
among similarly situated offenders has quadrupled since the
Booker decision (Sessions et al., 2010). However, a study
conducted by Bourassa and Andreescu (2009) to examine
sentencing disparities and racial inequality in Kentucky,
demonstrated that 34% of interracial differences in sentencing
can be explained by the characteristics of each case, with the use
of public attorneys being one of the most significant variables
contributing to these differences. While these findings
demonstrate the existence of systemic problems that go beyond
judicial discretion in sentencing, Starr and Rehavi (2013) found
that pre-sentencing decisions of prosecutors have substantial
consequences on the disparity in sentencing and find that racial
disparity in sentencing did not increase since Booker.
The Rise of the Collaborative Courts
Born out of judicial frustration with the cyclical nature
of treatment of drug offenders, as well as the mentally ill and the
homeless by the justice system, collaborative courts aim to
emphasize cooperation between all courtroom agents involved in
promoting treatment and rehabilitation of offenders to achieve
meaningful resolutions of social problems. These courts include
specialized courts for veterans, drug users, delinquent juveniles,
domestic violence cases, and for addressing many other social
problems that a conventional justice system is ill equipped to
deal with.
Convinced   of   the   justice   system’s   failure   to   adequately  
address social problems, state courts began to deviate from
imposing harsh prison and jail sentences in the late 1980s.
Encouraged by the success of the experimental Miami-Dade
Drug Court established in 1989, judges in other states began
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establishing their own versions of such diversionary programs
within   state   courts’   administration   (Wolf,   2005).   While   the  
legislature remained unwilling to tackle the problem of
inefficient and ineffective drug enforcement practices in the
justice system, despite several reports from the Sentencing
Commission urging reform, state judiciaries have organized a
concerted effort to bring together drug users and treatment
programs. The California Drug Court Task Force appointed by
Chief Justice George brought together judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, probation staff and treatment providers to
facilitate the coordination of services to those in need of them
(Wolf, 2005).
As collaborative courts have decreased caseloads and
diverted non-violent offenders from state prisons and local jails,
there is a growing movement towards adapting the practices of
collaborative courts to the conventional adversarial courts
(Farole, Puffet & Rempel, 2005).
However, despite the successes of collaborative courts
illustrated by a study that found Stanislaus County drug courts to
produce a 1:13 cost-benefit ratio (Carey, Crumpton, Finigan &
Waller, 2005), they are not a perfect solution to the variety of
social problems that the justice system has been forced to deal
with. As Leon and Shdaimah (2012) pointed out, collaborative
courts can have a negative effect on those they strive to serve by
coercing them into compliance with the program, which forces
them to either plead guilty or assume a stigma of deviance in
order to receive services. The practice of coercion that is used to
facilitate participation in more cost-effective collaborative courts
raises concerns over the due process rights of defendants who are
threatened with harsher punishment if they choose to fight their
cases. Additionally, collaborative courts rely on the threat of
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future punishment in order to ensure compliance with court
mandated treatments and supervision programs. Quinn (2009)
pointed out that amidst the stories of success, stories of people
who fail out of these programs get overlooked, despite the fact
that these people oftentimes get sent to prison to serve longer
sentences than they would have if they went through the
conventional justice system. While an imperfect solution, the
collaborative courts have been forced to attempt reforms from
inside the justice system, in the absence of meaningful legislative
action, and have contributed to the growing awareness of
alternative solutions to various social problems.
Recent  Changes:  Who’s  Got  the  Power?
As discussed earlier, despite the criticism of the
determinate sentencing scheme from academics, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and various non-profit
organizations such as the Families Against Mandatory
Minimums (FAMM), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
and Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP), legislatures
have been reluctant to implement significant changes to the
justice system. As Graham (2011) pointed out, instead of
amending   flawed   statutes,   “political   forces   typically   place  
upward pressure on criminal punishments or encourage
adherence to   the   status   quo”   (p.   769).   Although   the   passage   of  
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 might appear to be the rare case
of legislative initiative to amend the justice system, the
examination of underlying forces behind this reform reveals a
persistent pattern of reluctance to implement changes.
As judges and academics began to speak out against the
100:1 sentencing disparity between cases involving crack
cocaine and powder cocaine in the 1990s, the Sentencing
Commission began an investigation into the efficacy of this
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sentencing policy. Drafted as a response to the congressional
demand to examine cocaine sentencing policy, Sentencing
Commission’s   1995   report   found   that,   “1)   the   100:1   ratio   was  
disproportionate to the harms associated with the two drugs; 2)
courts could address the harms associated with crack through
specific non-drug-related enhancements; and 3) crack penalties
fell disproportionately on lower-level participants, most often
African-Americans”   (Cassidy,   2009,   p.   114).   These   findings,  
along with the recommendations for reform, were echoed in
three subsequent reports in 1997, 2002, and 2007, but received
no response from Congress. Following the 2007 report, the
Commission took action itself and implemented changes to the
Sentencing Guidelines that retroactively reduced average crack
cocaine sentence by 15 months. In addition to the actions taken
by the Sentencing Commission, a concerted lobbying campaign
by the coalition of advocacy groups, such as the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
ACLU, and The Sentencing Project – as well as some of the
Christian conservative and law enforcement organizations that
joined the movement – have prodded Congress to implement
changes that were demanded by President Obama and Attorney
General Holder (Gotsch, 2011).
Among other notable recent changes in sentencing
policy are Colorado Amendment 64 and Washington Initiative
502, both of which legalized recreational use of marijuana
despite federal classification of the drug as a schedule one
substance. Supported by state government officials, lawyers,
clergy members, and health officials, both of these reforms were
passed by popular vote during statewide referenda, indicating a
growing trend to bypass legislature in achieving criminal justice
reforms.
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This trend is also evident in recent changes to
California’s   justice   system   with   Proposition   36   amending   the  
state’s   Three   Strikes   law   in   2012,   and   the   recently   passed  
Proposition 47 reducing punishments for some non-violent
offenses and permitting retroactive resentencing. Proposition 36
was supported by several county district attorneys, law
professors, NAACP, and the Democratic party and passed with
69.3% of the vote. Proposition 47 passed with 59.3% of the vote,
but received a much greater bipartisan support. While many
district attorneys and sheriffs opposed Proposition 47, its
supporters included, among many others, both Democratic and
Republican politicians, as well as the NAACP, ACLU, The
Sentencing Project, Victim/Survivors Networks, and various
women’s,   religious,   and   health   organizations.   Although   these  
changes were not brought forth by state legislatures, the increase
in the number and diversity of supporters for meaningful
changes in criminal justice has the potential to spur legislatures
to   action,   as   was   the   case   with   Congress’   passage   of   the   Fair  
Sentencing Act of 2010.
Courts have also demonstrated their ability to force
action from the legislature. In Brown v. Plata (2011), the
Supreme   Court   declared   that   California’s   prison overcrowding
violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court
ordered the state to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of its
correctional   system’s   design   capacity,   but   allowed   the   state   to  
decide on the means by which it would be done (Brown v. Plata,
2011).   Forced   to   take   action,   California’s   legislature   responded  
to this decision by passing the Assembly Bill (AB) 109 and
AB117, also known as the Realignment Legislation. Under the
policy introduced by these bills, the newly sentenced non-violent
felony offender will now serve their sentence in county jails
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rather than state prisons, and persons found to be in technical
violations of their probation can no longer be returned to state
prisons and must be sanctioned to county jails or other
alternative sanctions, such as house arrest and intensive
probation. Although realignment reform did decrease
California’s   state   prison   population   by   nearly   30,000   people,   it  
has merely shifted the focus of correctional control to county
probation departments and jails (Quan, Abarbanel & Mukamal,
2014), demonstrating the inability of courts to force meaningful
changes without supportive legislative action.
Conclusion
As Rosenberg (2008) pointed out, without significant
political and administrative support, courts are limited in their
capacity to enact sweeping changes to social institutions. The
controversy of the Booker decision, coupled with certain
negative aspects of using collaborative courts to solve social
problems, indicate the lack of suitability of the court system to
be the source of comprehensive justice reforms. Court initiatives,
however, combined with the growing movement of social
advocacy groups and non-governmental agencies can influence
legislative action and bring about constructive changes to the
justice system. The persistence of lobbying by non-governmental
groups  and  courts’  demonstrations  of  plausible  alternatives  to  the  
mass incarceration policy have prompted the Department of
Justice review of all phases of the criminal justice system.
Following this review, Attorney General Holder launched the
Smart on Crime campaign aimed at reforming the justice system
through  amending  Department  of  Justice’s  policies  and  practices,  
as well as seeking political support and action from Congress
(Department of Justice, 2013). Now, more than ever, there
appears to be some political support for meaningful reforms.
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In August of 2013, a bill was introduced in the senate
called the Smarter Sentencing Act. If passed, this legislation will
make the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive, reduce
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, and expand the
existing   “safety   valve”   exception   for   federal   drug   offenses   that  
allows judges to sentence offenders below the mandatory
minimum sentence if they meet certain criteria (H.R. 3382,
2013). The proposition of this bill in Congress, however, is not
enough, as similar bills have been voted down before. A
concerted rigorous campaign by advocacy groups, judges, and
social movements must persist and continue to prod legislatures
to take action.
State and federal legislatures have the ultimate power to
create and fund alternative institutions that can address various
social problems. While legislatures failed to exercise a measure
of restraint when dealing with moral panics in the past, only they
have the power to correct their mistakes through meaningful
legislative reform. However, where Horowitz (1977) sees an
ongoing struggle for policymaking between the courts and
legislatures, and where Rosenberg (2008) denies courts the
power to enact changes on their own, there exists a much more
intricate power dynamic. While legislatures do hold the true
power to change the system, courts can greatly influence and
empower reluctant politicians. Through their decisions in legal
cases, courts provide legitimacy and empower social advocacy
groups, while the successes of the collaborative courts strengthen
their demands for alternative means of dealing with social
problems. These advocacy groups, along with the courts,
increase societal awareness of both the problem and the
possibility of reform. It is that awareness and the changes in
public opinion that can create a tipping point and force
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politicians   to   abandon   the   old   adage   of   “tough   on   crime”   and  
embrace smarter and more efficient policies and practices.
Societal changes do not occur overnight, nor do they
occur in a vacuum of legislative action. All social agents and
institutions hold a measure of power to bring forth meaningful
changes in the criminal justice reform. The real change,
however, will only happen when, and only if, all of these actors
play their parts in an intricate scheme of power distribution in
today’s  society.
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